We propose a new way of quantifying a team's strength of schedule for NCAA basketball. This strength of a schedule is defined as the number of games a team on the borderline of the annual national tournament would expect to win if they played that schedule. This gives a direct way of quantifying how well different teams have done relative to the schedules they have played. Our motivation for constructing this strength of schedule is to help inform the choice of teams given bids to the national tournament: teams who have won more games than their strength of schedule have strongest evidence that they deserve such a bid.
of 26 − 7. Our results in Section 4 support both these decisions, due to the substantially more difficult schedule that Arizona played.
We shall call the strength of a team's opponents their strength of schedule. The aim of this paper is to construct a meaningful measure of a team's strength of schedule that will make it possible to directly compare different teams' win-loss records after accounting for the different opponents that they have played. Our strength of schedule is calculated by first considering a fictitious team of a certain standard. We then estimate on average how many games that team would win if they played a specific schedule. This expected number of wins is the strength of that schedule, and is a benchmark against which we can compare a team's actual win-loss record. By choosing the standard of this fictitious team to be that of a team who is right on the borderline for receiving an at-large bid, we immediately get an indication of which teams have performed well enough to receive an at-large bid: they will have won more games than their strength of schedule indicates. Thus we claim this gives a simple, and easily interpretable, indication that could guide the decision made on selection Sunday. Calculation of each team's strength of schedule is posssible through applying a statistical model (Stefani, 1980; Harville and Smith, 1994) to the results of matches in the current season.
The outline of the paper is as follows. We first discuss existing statistics that are calculated for NCAA basketball teams, and outline the difficulties in using these to guide selection of teams for at-large bids. We then introduce a simple statistical model for analysing results of basketball matches, and show how this model can be used to estimate the probability that a team would win a given match. In Section 3 we then show how we can use this model, fitted to the current season's results, to calculate each team's strength of schedule. We will also explain why we believe calculating our strength of schedule is more appropriate than using other inferences from the fitted model to help guide selection of teams for at-large bids. We then analyse data from 
Current use of statistics
Currently a number of statistical summaries of each team's performance are calculated to help guide which teams have performed best in a given season, and thus deserve an at-large bid. One system used to rank teams is the ranking percentage index (RPI). Initially it was calculated as a weighted average of team's winning percentage, their opponents' winning percentages, and their opponents' opponents' winning percentages. The weights are 1/4, 1/2 and 1/4 respectively. More recently it has been changed slightly to give more weight in a team's winning percentage to away wins and home losses, and less weight to home wins and away losses.
The RPI attempts to take account of both a team's winning percentage and its strength of schedule, although it does this in a somewhat ad-hoc manner. There have been a number of articles criticising the RPI (see e.g. cheap ticket to the dance: systematic bias in college basketball's rating percentage index, 2007, and references therein).
The RPI is often used to construct further summaries of a team's performance. This includes reporting a team's win-loss record against opponents who are ranked in, say, the top 50 teams based on RPI. Even if the RPI was accurately defining the top 50 teams, there are problems with such summaries. The main problem is that it over-emphasises wins against teams just inside the top 50 as opposed to those against teams just outside; and by comparison it ignores the widely differing standards of teams within the top 50. These drawbacks are discussed in more detail in Section 4.
Related to the RPI, is a measure of a team's strength of schedule based on the RPI excluding the team's own winning percentage. This strength of schedule is often reported in terms of its rank relative to all other teams: so it gives information about which team has had the hardest schedule, the second hardest schedule, and so on.
We will highlight two problems with this approach to calculating and reporting teams' strength of schedule, both of which will be addressed by our approach to calculating a team's strength of schedule. The first problem is that the ranking Whereas for one of the weakest teams the former would be, with the team likely to lose all matches except against Alcorn State. Thus if we are calculating strength of schedules to help with the selection of teams for at-large bids, we need to take account of the ability of those teams that will be in contention.
A New Strength of Schedule
Our approach addresses these two problems by calculating a team's strength of schedule in terms of the expected number of wins a team on the borderline of receiving an at-large bid would get if they played that schedule. We now describe how we can calculate this. We first present a standard statistical model for basketball data which we will use, and then show how after fitting this model we can calculate each team's strength of schedule.
Modelling and Predicting Basketball Results
Currently the NCAA men's basketball 1st division has 347 teams, with the number, n, of regular season matches (prior to selection Sunday) being around 5, 000. Following Stefani (1977 Stefani ( , 1980 ; Harville and Smith (1994); Harville (2003) , we consider a linear model for the difference in the scores between the two teams in a basketball match. We assume the teams are numbered, arbitrarily, from 1 to 347. The model has parameters β j , j = 1, . . . , 347 corresponding to the relative ability of the teams, and γ which corresponds to home advantage.
For match i let the teams be a i and b i , and let z i take the value 1 if team a i is at home, -1 if team b i is at home, and 0 if the match is at a neutral venue. Finally, let y i be team a i 's score less team b i 's score at the end of regulation time. So a positive value corresponds to team a i winning, and a negative score corresponds to team b i winning, and 0 corresponds to the match entering overtime. Then our model is, for i = 1, . . . , n,
where σ is the standard error of the residuals, and we assume that each ǫ i is a realisation of an independent standard normal random variable. non-conference teams. So we introduce mean conference strengths η k , for k = 1, . . . , 32. We assume that if team j belongs to conference c j then β j has a normal prior with mean η k and variance τ 2 t ; and we assume normal priors for η c j s with mean 0 and variance τ 2 c . The remaining parameters in the model, γ, σ, τ c and τ t are estimated by maximising the marginal likelihood.
One way of interpreting the priors is that they perform shrinkage. Note that the priors include no a priori information about which teams or which conferences tend to be stronger. Allowing for the differences in conference strengths is important because the majority of each team's matches are within conference, and without this structure the priors would over-shrink teams in good, or bad, conferences towards 0. The effect of the prior is noticeable when estimating parameters mid-way through the season, though has only a minor effect on estimates at the end of the season. By introducing this prior we avoid any problems of unidentifiability, and the effect of the prior is to center the estimates of the βs around an average of 0.
Previous analyses using this model (e.g. Harville, 2003) have used the resulting estimates of the βs to rank teams. However we argue that using such a ranking is not appropriate for choosing which teams should be given at-large bids. The reason for this is that the estimates of a β j will depend only on the opponents of team j and team j's net points difference in those matches. It does not directly depend on the number of matches that team j wins. However, we would want the choice of teams for the national tournament to be governed by their win-loss record (after accounting for their opponents). This is natural, as if two teams played identical schedules you would rank the team who won more matches higher, and not the team with the better net points difference. Also it means that a team's best strategy in each game is always to try and win the game, such as by deliberately fouling to get the ball back towards the end of a game, even if this risks losing by a bigger margin.
Calculating the Strength of Schedule
Rather than using the estimates of the linear model (1) directly to rank teams, we instead use them to construct a strength of schedule for each team. This strength of schedule is based on calculating the expected number of matches a fictitious team, of fixed ability, would win if they played the schedule. Let the strength of this fictitious team be β 0 . In order to calculate these strength of schedules, we need a way of estimating the probability a team of this strength would have of a winning any specific match.
Consider a match against team j, and let z be an indicator of which team is at home, defined as above. The linear model (1) gives that the probability that the fictitious team would win is
where Φ is the distribution function of the standard normal distribution. This follows by considering the possible values of the error term in the linear model which corresponds to the fictitious team scoring more points than team j. Note that this calculation ignores the discrete nature of the difference in scores, and thus the possibility of the match entering over-time. However alternative approaches, for example based on over-time corresponding to an absolute difference in the two teams' scores being less than 1/2 and a subsequent model for the likelihood of each time winning in over-time, give negligible difference from using (2).
Empirically this approach to predicting the probability of wins is supported by the normal qq-plot of the residuals of the linear model, see Figure 1 (a). Also, for the actual regular season matches we compared predicted win probabilities of the first named team in each match, against actual frequency of wins. We calculated both mean predicted probability and frequency for sets of 400 matches. The sets of matches were obtained by first ranking the matches in terms of the predicted probability of a win, and then each set contains 400 consecutive matches from this list. This ensures that each set contains matches with similar predicted win probabilities. A plot of actual against predicted is shown in Figure 1 (b), and
shows the actual frequency to almost always lie within approximate 95% confidence regions obtained from the predicted probabilities.
We cannot directly use (2) as it depends on unknown parameters β j , γ and σ.
Our approach is to plug in our estimates of γ and σ, and then average over the posterior distribution for β j , given the data from all regular season matches.
Note that the posterior for β j can be calculated analytically, and the expectation over the posterior can be done numerically.
To calculate a teams strength of schedule, for a given β 0 , we just sum these expected win probabilities for each of the matches that that team played. We can also estimate the posterior variance of the probability (2) for each match, and this can be used to determine an approximate standard error for the estimate of a team's strength of schedule.
As described above, our strength of schedule for each team will depend on β 0 .
The relative value of each team's strength of schedule will depend on this choice.
For example in the limit as β 0 → −∞, each strength of schedule will tend to 0 expected wins, whereas as in the limit as β 0 → ∞ the expected number of wins will tend to the number of games played. As we are interested in distinguishing between teams on the borderline for receiving an at-large bid, it is most appropriate for β 0 to be chosen to be similar in value to the value of β for such a team. In practice our approach is to choose β 0 such that exactly 34 non-conference champions have more wins than the expected number of wins given by their strength of schedule. These 34 teams are thus the ones which this approach suggests should be given at-large bids. In practice, small variations around this value make little impact on the rankings of the teams.
Results
We (1) corresponds to a team with β 0 = 11.8, and (2) to one with β 0 = −11.8.
Columns H, A, and N correspond to a home, away and neutral match for the fictitious team.
A small selection of teams, and corresponding estimated β j s are given in Table   1 . This table also gives the predicted probability that two fictitious teams would win a match against each of these teams. The first of these teams is chosen to be of a standard comparable to a team on the borderline of getting a bid -and is the standard of team we use in calculating strength of schedules below. The second team is chosen to be of a standard comparable to one of the weaker division I teams.
The results in Table 1 From Table 1 we see the problem of using the estimates of the β j s to rank teams for inclusion in the national tournament. Neither Georgetown nor Kansas State recieved bids for the tournament in 2009, whilst Dayton did. In total these rankings gave 9 teams in the top 34 non-conference champions that did not receive bids to the tournament. The reason for this disparity is that the estimates of the β j s are based on point-differences in matches and not just the results of those matches. So teams like Georgetown had few wins given their net point-difference in the matches they played.
Finally, we also see that there is a much larger difference between the estimate of β j for North Carolina and Georgetown, as compared to that between Georgetown and either LSU or even Dayton. This highlights the problem of summaries based on win-loss records against top-50 teams, as it ignores the substantial difference in difficulty of a match against a team like North Carolina, as opposed to one like Georgetown. The biggest differences in ability of teams is within roughly the top-10 teams, and there is comparably little difference between teams ranked just within or just outside the top-50.
2008/09 Season
We now focus on the estimated strength of schedules for teams from the 2008/09
season, and the information they give about who deserved at-large bids to the national tournament. We calculated strength of schedule for all teams, and we
give results for a subset of teams in Table 2 . Here we focus on teams ranked by the difference in their actual win percentage and the win percentage given by their strength of schedule. We excluded conference champions, and give results for the teams close to position 34 -the borderline for receiving an at-large bid.
As described in Section 3, we fixed the ability of the fictitious team to such that 34 non-conference champions won more matches than their strength of schedule.
This corresponded to β 0 = 11.8. We also quantified the uncertainty in the estimates of the strength of schedule, through estimating the posterior variance of the predicted win probability for each match. To summarise these, we calculated the average variance in the estimate of the strength of schedules for all teams. This average variance is 0.088. This suggests that estimates of strength of schedules are accurate to within plus or minus 0.6, based on twice the corresponding standard error.
The 34 non conference champions who won more games than their strength of schedule (see Table 2 ) contain two teams not given at-large bids to the national championship. Teams who actually received an at-large bids are marked by * . SOS is given in terms of the predicted number of wins.
Michigan was very close, the former's strength of schedule was 0.2 less than the number of games won, and the latter's was 0.1 more. These are both comfortably within the margin of error of the estimates of the strength of schedule, which was 0.6.
However there appears to be clear evidence that St. Mary's should have been preferred to Wisconsin for an at-large bid. The omission of St. Mary's from the national championship could be explained by an injury to one of their players, Paddy Mills, near the end of season, and resulting uncertainty over whether he would be fully fit for the championship. However, even allowing for this, the results in Table 2 suggest that teams other than Wisconsin should have been given a bid instead.
2007/08 Season
We now repeat the analysis for the 2007/08 season and results are given in Table   3 . We again estimate the margin of error of the strength of schedules as twice the estimated standard error, and this is 0.6. give them an at-large bid.
However our results suggest that the other two teams, South Alabama and St.
Joseph's were fortunate to receive bids. In particular St. Joseph's won 21 matches with a strength of schedule of 22.7, suggesting that they required 2 extra wins to warrant an at large bid. To look into this further we compare the schedules of St. Joseph's with that of Arizona State, who won 19 matches with a strength of schedule of 18.4 but were not given an at-large bid. The schedules, together with the win probabilities that are used to calculate the strength of schedule are given in Table 4 .
The argument against Arizona State is that they had "RPI in the 80s, nonconference SOS in the 300s, a 9-9 league record and 5-10 in its last 15 matches" Glockner (2008 
